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Abstract
This study explores the economic mechanisms behind the decline of a surface transportation network, based on the
assumption that the decline phase is a spontaneous process driven by decentralized decisions of individual travelers and
privatized links. A simulation model is developed with a degeneration process by which the weakest link is removed iter-
atively from the network. Experiments reveal how the economic e ciency of a network evolves during the degeneration
process and suggest an ‘‘optimal’’ degenerated network could be derived during the decline phase in terms of maximizing
total social welfare.
  2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Transportation systems, like other economic entities, decline when they become proﬁtless. Examples
include the canal system in England (Fullerton, 1975), the interurban in North America (Hilton and Due,
1960), and more recently, the networks of Amtrak and Greyhound in the United States. According to
Garrison and Levinson (2006), there were 416,000 km of railroad in the United States by 1920, which has
shrunk to about 272,000 km in the present.
The decline of a transportation system can be caused by a wide variety of technical, economic, social, and
political reasons. From an economic perspective, this study focuses on a surface transportation system that
fails to recover its costs from its income and thus shrinks. A planar transportation system is usually embodied
as a network in which locations and facilities (nodes) are connected by trails, tracks or paved roads (links). If
the network cannot earn its keep as it evolves, it becomes economically ine cient and some of the weakest
links have to be abandoned.
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The purpose of this study is to investigate the economic mechanisms behind the decline of a transportation
network and their consequences. The following section presents a review of related literature. In the model
section the simulation model is presented, followed by performance measures from di erent perspectives.
Then simulation experiments are outlined and results presented. The conclusion part summarizes our ﬁndings
and suggests implications for future research.
2. Literature review
Life cycle theory explains the decline of a transportation network at a macroscopic level (Mensch, 1979;
Nakicenovic, 1988; Garrison and Levinson, 2006). According to life cycle theory, most technologies (e.g.
transportation modes) experience the phases of birth, growth, maturity, and decline in their evolutions.
The S-curve technique provides a tool to describe the life cycle of a transportation mode collectively, relating
the mode’s share of ﬁnal market and time. However, it is still insu cient to understand the microscopic mech-
anisms behind the evolution of transportation systems.
The evolution of a transportation network has traditionally been attributed to the top-down decisions made
by central agencies, such as engineers, planners, and policy makers. Since the 1970s, planners and transpor-
tation researchers have sought to ﬁnd optimal improvements to a network, in order to achieve stated planning
objectives given the constraints of available resources, well known as ‘‘Network Design Problems’’ (Boyce
et al., 1974; Yang and Bell, 1998). Based on the assumption that a network can be optimized, Vaughan
(1987) discussed the design of optimum network geometry, while Schweitzer et al. (1998) applied two strategies
to ﬁnd optimal decisions for the evolution of a road network.
Recent studies, however, have suggested that the macro characteristics of a complex system, rather than
being designed by authorities, could be shaped by simple, perhaps myopic behaviors of underlying entities
(Schelling, 1978; Krugman, 1996). The concepts of reinforcement and degeneration have then been introduced
to interpret the evolution of complex systems as a bottom-up agent-based process in many areas (Barabasi
et al., 1999; Barabasi and Bonabeau, 2003; Newman, 2003), claiming that a complex network evolves through
interactions with its environment with successful agents of the system reinforced while less successful ones dep-
recated or abandoned.
Among the few studies that interpret the evolution of a transportation network as an agent-based process,
Helbing et al. (1997) simulates the evolution of human trails in urban green spaces, in which frequently used
trails are reinforced and made more attractive while rarely used trails are destroyed by ‘‘the weathering
e ects’’. Yamins et al. (2003) present a simulation of road dynamics on a land use lattice according to simple
growing rules. Yerra and Levinson (2005) and Levinson and Yerra (2006) model each link in a road network
as an agent that can invest autonomously so that proﬁtable links get expanded while proﬁtless links get con-
tracted. Zhang and Levinson (2004) examined the growth of a real-world congesting network – the Twin Cities
road network. Based on the network topology in 1978, simulation experiments were carried out to ‘‘predict’’
road expansions in 20 years under di erent initial conditions and constraints. Comparing predicted 1998 net-
works to the real one, they found like road hierarchies emerged especially for low-level roads, whether they
started from the real 1978 network with observed road capacities or a hypothetical network with uniform
capacities. All these studies, however, assume a ﬁxed network structure, thus not allowing less developed links
to be fully degenerated or abandoned.
Questions arise accordingly when we try to interpret the decline phase of a transportation network as a
completely bottom-up process that is driven by decisions made by underlying agents such as travelers and
privatized links: how could this process be modeled in a as possible as simple form so that simulation can
be executed for su cient iterations in an acceptable duration, while incorporating all the essential components
such as land use, tra c ﬂow, agent behaviors, and network decline? How will a declining network evolve as a
decentralized and competitive market? How do economists, policy makers, and transportation planners eval-
uate market performance di erently, and can they at least approach their respective objectives by interfering
with the market during the decline phase?
To answer these questions, a simulation model which we refer to as the degeneration model is developed to
implement the abandonment of links in a network by introducing a process in which the weakest links are
eliminated each round based on a myopic evaluation of individual operating performance. Following Levin-
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son and Yerra (2006), individual travelers choose their destinations and routes to minimize their travel cost
while independent link agents invest (disinvest) in themselves according to their revenue and costs associated
with predicted tra c on the network.
3. Model
Fig. 1 illustrates the ﬂowchart of the degeneration model. Network evolution has been modeled as an iter-
ative dynamic process, which includes ﬁve sequential steps for each iteration: exogenous input, degeneration,
land use dynamics, travel demand dynamics, and investment. These steps are explained as follows.
The exogenous inputs include a base transportation network structure and a land use layer, speciﬁed initial
land use data, and initial link speeds. Our study, following Levinson and Yerra (2006), models the land use
layer as a grid of land blocks (i.e., land use cells). Each land use cell holds the information of its location, pop-
ulation density and market density. The transportation network is modeled as a directed network overlaying
the land use layer. Since the nodes and links are removable during the degeneration process, the collection of
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Fig. 1. Flowchart of the transportation network degeneration model.
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respectively, where i is the time period in the simulation. The network layer and land use layer are connected
dynamically and are able to a ect each other through network nodes. The land use layer, however, is ﬁxed in
this study to understand network dynamics in isolation.
The degeneration process is characterized by the degeneration criteria, which specify simple rules to select
and kill less developed links. When all links connected to a node are killed, the node may be killed, depending
on speciﬁc degeneration criteria. The degeneration criteria used in this study will be speciﬁed later.
For simplicity this study assumes that trips produced from and attracted to land use cells are subject to a
speciﬁc distribution and only tests the uniform distribution in this study. Each land use cell is allocated to the
closest network node. The time cost of accessing the nearest network node from a land use cell is called the
‘‘access cost’’, which will be explained later. Note that if a network node is eliminated in the degeneration pro-
cess, the land use cells previously allocated to this node will be re-allocated to other nodes. Consequently, the
access costs of network nodes also need to be re-calculated.
This study incorporates a simpliﬁed travel demand model which basically follows the classic four-step
model (Ortuzar and Willumsen, 2001) with two important simpliﬁcations. First, a single mode is considered
throughout, and thus modal choice is ignored. Second, congestion e ects are ignored in tra c assignment.
Although the congestion may occur in the short run given relatively inelastic road capacity, in the long run
the model assumes that the congested (heavily traveled) links generate excess revenue (revenue greater than
existing maintenance and operation costs) and they can invest their excess income to improve their capacities.
Therefore, instead of modeling the congestion e ect using the link performance function (i.e., link ﬂow-cost
function), we adopt an all-or-nothing assignment and model the economic investment behaviors of links from
the long-term perspective of transportation network dynamics. The simpliﬁed travel demand model includes
four component models: trip generation, shortest path ﬁnding, trip distribution, and tra c assignment.
In the trip generation step the total trips produced and attracted from a network node are calculated by
summing up trips of all the land use cells allocated to this network node.
Dijkstra’s Algorithm (Chachra et al., 1979) is adopted to ﬁnd the shortest path, i.e., the path with the lowest
generalized cost, from an origin node to all other nodes in the network. Let ci
a represent the generalized cost on
link a for iteration i. This cost is calculated as the linear combination of time cost and monetary cost (in this
study, toll represents all monetary costs spent on travel) as shown in the following equation:
c
i
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where g is time value, la is the length of link a, f i
a, and mi
a are the average ﬂow (volume) and average speed of
link a for iteration i. Coe cients s, q1, q2, and q3 are the toll rate, length coe cient, ﬂow coe cient, and speed
coe cient speciﬁed in the revenue model, respectively.
The bolded curve in Fig. 2 represents the shortest path originated from node R to all other nodes. The path
from R to S can be abstracted as {PRS}, i.e., the set of links along the shortest path from origin R to desti-
nation S. Suppose m land use cells r1,r2,...,rm are allocated to node R and n land use cells s1,s2,...,sn are
allocated to node S. The travel cost from origin R to destination S along the shortest path for iteration i











Fig. 2. Calculation of the generalized cost between two nodes.
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where the ﬁrst part on the right-hand side of the equation calculates the average access cost walking from the
land use cells allocated to node R to this node. The variable drj represents the distance from a land use cell rj to
node R. The variable m0 is a speciﬁed minimal speed, which can be interpreted as the speed for accessing the
closest network nodes from the land use layer. Similarly, the third part calculates the average access cost from
node S to the land use cells attached to it. The second part sums the generalized costs of the links in {PRS}
where d
i
a;RS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a link belongs to {PRS} and 0 otherwise.
Similar to Eq. (2), the travel cost from a land use cell rj attached to origin R to a land use cell sk attached to
destination S along the shortest path for iteration i can be calculated as
c
i
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A trip table (origin–destination matrix) is computed using a gravity-based trip distribution model (Hutch-
inson, 1974). The number of trips from origin R to destination S is calculated as
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where gR is trips produced from origin R. The variable hS represents trips attracted to destination S. The var-
iable Q is any node in the network other than R. The variable h is a speciﬁed friction factor representing the
disinclination to travel as travel cost rises.
The investment process incorporates links as agents that make their independent economic decisions
according to simple, myopic rules. In the reality, two nodes can be connected either by two neighboring links
with opposite directions, say link a from node R to node S and link b from node S to node R, or by a one-way
link, say link a only. In the latter case, however, there may arise the issue that travelers cannot reach S from R
on the network. To ensure the connectivity of a network throughout a decline phase, this study focuses on
networks that are connected only by two-way links. This study also assumes that links a and b are operated
at the same speed level by a single agent. The reason is twofold. First, in practice, both directions of a segment
are usually built simultaneously and maintained at the same service level. Second, if the two parallel and oppo-
site links connecting two nodes operate separately, they may develop into di erent service levels. It is obvi-
ously not reasonable to remove both links from the network at a time (since one-way links are not
allowed) just because one of them is weak. Thus the single-agent assumption is made to bond the two links.
Let f i
a and f i
b, respectively, represent the ﬂows of link a and link b for iteration i. The variable vi
ab represents
the speed of both links for iteration i. An agent operates the two links as a whole, gathering revenues from
both links, maintaining them according to their respective costs, and then (dis)investing in the speed of the
two links for each iteration, respectively, according to three following component models: a revenue model,
a cost model, and an investment model.
3.1. Revenue model
Tolls are collected by links according to the length of link, the ﬂow traversing the link and the speed level.
The toll revenue gathered by the agent operating link a and link b for iteration i is calculated as follows:
E
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where lab is the length of both links given that link a and link b have the same length.
3.2. Cost model
The cost to maintain a link in its present usable condition depends on its length, ﬂow, and speed. The cost
of a link is divided into ﬁxed and variable components. Fixed cost is independent of ﬂow and speed and only
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related to link length. The cost spent by the agent operating links a and b for iteration i is calculated by adding
up the ﬁxed and variable costs spent by both links as
C
i
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where l1 is the variable cost rate and l2 is the ﬁxed cost rate. The coe cients a1, a2, and a3 are the length
power, ﬂow power, and speed power speciﬁed in the cost model.
3.3. Investment model
Each link (agent) is assumed to spend all available revenue at the end of each iteration without saving for
the next time step. If the revenue gathered from link a and link b for iteration i is greater than the maintenance




ab, remaining revenue will be invested to increase its running speed. As a result, the
speed of both links increases. In contrast, if the revenue is insu cient to cover the cost, the speed drops. This
simple investment policy adopted by each agent in the network can be expressed as
m
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where b is a speciﬁed speed improvement coe cient.
4. Performance measurement
The performance of a transportation system has been the subject of interest to a wide range of professions,
each with unique concerns and objectives (Levinson, 2003). Viewing a transportation network as a single mar-
ket, economists aim to maximize the total social welfare system wise, while local government and city planners
may care about only the surplus of travelers, given that all the links are assumed to be private in this study. In
recent years, more and more transportation planners and engineers aim to improve accessibility (Hanson,
1986; Niemeier, 1997), which refers to the ease with which desired destinations may be reached via a network,
taking into account both transportation and land use of a region. Employing our simulation model, perfor-
mance measures are developed from di erent perspectives and traced throughout the decline phase of a net-
work to examine how decentralized decisions of travelers and autonomous links drive the rise and fall of a
network over space and time, as well as how di erent professions could tackle this process to approach their
respective objectives.
4.1. Consumers’ surplus
On a transportation network, travelers enjoy consumers’ surplus when the generalized travel cost (including
travel time and toll) that they actually pay for traveling is lower than that they would be willing to pay. Fig. 3
plots the conceptual demand curve and supply curves for a pair of land use cells in a single transportation



















Fig. 3. The demand curve of a pair of land use cells.
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the increase of the generalized travel cost between two cells. This relation deﬁnes a downward demand curve D
of the O–D pair. Curves S
i 1 and S
i are the supply curves of two consecutive iterations i   1 and i, respec-
tively. For iteration i   1, q
i 1 trips are generated from cell r to cell s at the generalized cost c
i 1 upon the
equilibrium between the demand and supply. Consumer surplus enjoyed by travelers from the origin cell r
to the destination cell s is represented as area a–e–b for iteration i   1 while as area a–f–c for iteration i.
Assuming the portion of demand curve from e to f is linear, the change of consumer surplus from iteration
i   1 to i, i.e., area b–e–f–c, can be approximated using the ‘‘rule of 1/2’’ (Neuberger, 1971), which indicates
that where demand changes in response to the increase or decrease in costs, with relatively small changes in
costs, the convention is to attribute half of the change in costs to the trips lost or gained. The total change of
consumers’ surplus on a network is then calculated by adding up those changes of all cell pairs as follows:
DU
i   U
i   U













;  8 
where r–s is a pair of land use cells on the land use layer.
Note that the linear assumption for the rule of 1/2 only stands over small changes on the demand curve and
may be violated by changes in the structure of the network. This explains why the land use cell instead of link
or node is selected as the geographical unit upon which we approximate the changes of consumers’ surplus by
pairs. Di erent from permanent land use cells in our model, both links and nodes are removable during the
degeneration process. When a link or a node is removed, all the trips currently associated to the link or node
will immediately be re-allocated to remaining links or node pairs, resulting in an abrupt rightward shift of the
demand curves of links or node pairs. In this case, the small change assumption no longer stands and we can-
not approximate the change of consumers’ surplus using the ‘‘rule of 1/2’’.
4.2. Welfare
Total social welfare is deﬁned here as consumers’ surplus plus proﬁt. Autonomous links supply services
(road bed, pavement, track, speed, etc.) at di erent levels and earn their proﬁt when the revenue (toll) they
collect from travelers are in excess of the cost of providing these services. The earning of each link agent
can be calculated by subtracting its maintenance cost from its revenue according to Eqs. (5) and (6), then
the earnings of all existing agents are added up to the total proﬁt P. The change of total proﬁt from iteration
i   1 to iteration i can be calculated as
DP
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where ab is any existing link-agent on the network with two opposite links a and b.
The change of total social welfare from iteration i   1 to i is then calculated as
DW
i   DU
i   DP
i:  10 






k   DP
k   
:  11 
4.3. Accessibility
A variety of accessibility measures have been developed in di erent ﬁelds, among which the gravity-type
measure (Basmaciyan and Schmidt, 1964; Handy, 1992) is perhaps most widely adopted. This type of measure
is typically expressed as a function of available opportunities moderated by some measure of impedance which
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where KS is a measure of the attractiveness of the destination node S, while cRS the generalized cost of travel
from R to S, referring to Eq. (2). A typical analytical expression of the function can be either in an exponential
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where the number of trips attracted to node S (hS) is used to indicate the attractiveness of this node, referring
to Eq. (4).
5. Experiments
A series of ﬁve experiments were carried out on a hypothetical surface transportation network with the
same initial conditions, including the same set of link speeds randomly distributed between 1 and 10, and
the same set of uniform land uses (resulting in 10 trips generated from and 10 trips attracted to each cell
per day). The hypothetical network is called the 4 · 4 complete network, which is developed by directly con-
necting every pair of two nodes among an original node set {V*} that come from the intersection nodes of a
4 · 4 grid network. When links intersect, a new secondary node is created, and the longer link is replaced by
shorter links that ultimately connect the same original nodes. A secondary node is not necessarily directly con-
nected to an original node or another secondary node. Where links overlap, the longer link is eliminated. A
complete network represents a highly redundant network that is expected to decline over time.
All the experiments conducted in this study shared the following set of degeneration criteria to delete the
weakest link(s) from the network at each time period.
First, the weakest link among existing removable links is killed at the beginning of iteration i. A removable
link is one which, by its removal, does not disconnect the network. Di erent rules to select the weakest link
will be discussed later in this section.
Second, one two-way link is killed at a time. Once a link from node R to node S is killed, the other (parallel
and reverse) link from node S to node R operated by the same agent will be automatically killed. Thus two
links will be killed at a time. This rule ensures a minimal number of links to be killed in each round.
Third, if a node exists, it must be connected to at least one existing node. Isolated nodes and sub-networks
are not allowed for the whole network.
Experiments are summarized in Table 1, and Table 2 lists model parameters and their values speciﬁed for
the experiments. As can be seen, the experiments only di er on when to start and when to stop executing the
degeneration process, as well as how to select the weakest link(s).
As shown in Table 1, Experiments A1–A3 di er only on when a degeneration process is implemented.
Before the degeneration process is started, a network grows with its structure ﬁxed, similar in nature to those
presented in Yerra and Levinson (2005) and Levinson and Yerra (2006), and the equilibrium of growth is
reached when the network does not change in two consecutive iterations. Since all the experiments reached
the equilibrium of network growth within 20 iterations, the 20th iteration was speciﬁed as the starting point
of the degeneration process, if any, for all the experiments. Experiment A1 never started a degeneration pro-
cess. Thus the network stayed stable after the network growth reached equilibrium. Experiment A2 started the
Table 1
Speciﬁcations of experiments
No. Degeneration process Iterations
Start End Indicator
A1 Never NA Speed 850
A2 After network growth reaches equilibrium When minimally connected network is obtained Speed
A3 Right after the cumulative change of total welfare peaks Speed
B When minimally connected network is obtained Volume
C B/C ratio
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degeneration process at the 20th iteration, and terminated it when the minimally connected network is derived.
Experiment A3 stopped the degeneration when the cumulative change of total welfare peaks in A1.
The experiments A2, B, and C di er only on the indicator used to evaluate the performance of individual
links and identify the weakest. Three plausible indicators are tested. Note that the degeneration model
assumes a link and its neighboring (parallel and reverse) link are operated by a single agent at the same speed.
Experiment A2 kills the link with the lowest speed among all the existing removable links and automatically
kills its neighboring link. Experiment B kills the two links operated by the agent with the lowest through-tra c
volume (the sum of the tra c on both links). Experiment C kills the agent operated at the lowest beneﬁt–cost
ratio (BCR). Referring to Eqs. (5) and (6), the BCR for the agent operating links a and b at iteration i is cal-
culated as
BCR   E
i
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where Eab is the revenue collected from links a and b, Cﬁxed,ab is the ﬁxed cost spent on a and b, and Cvar,ab is
the variable cost.
6. Results
Fig. 4 illustrates the ﬂuctuations of the cumulative change of total social welfare derived from Experiments
A1–A3. As we begin to calculate the cumulative change of welfare at the 20th iteration when the degeneration
process, if any, is started, i* is equal to 20 in Eq. (11). As a plausible approximation, the change of welfare is
calculated every ﬁve iterations to save running time. In other words, each curve demonstrates the cumulative
change of welfare from the end of the 15th iteration every ﬁve iterations. Note also that three curves start from
the same point with the same cumulative change at the 20th iteration because the three experiments went
through exactly the same network growth process before the degeneration was started at this iteration.
Experiment A1 speciﬁes the network growth model without degeneration. The A1 curve starts at the 20th
iteration where the cumulative change of welfare equals  576.1, indicating the welfare decreases about 576
units since the 15th iteration. Since the network reached equilibrium before the 20th iteration, the A1 curve
remains ﬂat in the following iterations. The fact that the welfare declines as the network evolves between
the base year and the equilibrium year (given that cumulative welfare change remains negative) suggests that
most links in this network cannot maintain their speciﬁed initial service levels, and that removing the ine -
cient links from the network could improve the overall e ciency.
Experiment A2 starts degeneration at the 20th iteration and executes the degeneration process until com-
pletion. The cumulative welfare unsurprisingly keeps increasing and reaches the maximum at the 65th itera-
tion. Since the degeneration process is enforced in this experiment to remove links each round regardless of the
network e ciency, some useful links have to be removed from the remaining network after this turning point,
pulling the welfare down dramatically. After the degeneration process is stopped at the 805th iteration when
Table 2
Model parameters and their speciﬁed values
Parameters Description Value
q1 Length coe cient in Eqs. (1) and (5) 1.0
q2 Flow coe cient in Eqs. (1) and (5) 1.0
q3 Speed coe cient in Eqs. (1) and (5) 0.0
s Toll rate in Eqs. (1) and (5) 1.0
g Value of time in Eqs. (1)–(3) 0.6
v0 Walking speed in Eqs. (2) and (3) 0.01
h Friction factor in Eq. (4) 0.01
l1 Variable cost rate in Eq. (6) 1.0
l2 Fixed cost rate in Eq. (6) 2.0
a1 Length power in Eq. (6) 1.0
a2 Flow power in Eq. (6) 0.75
a3 Speed power in Eq. (6) 0.75
b Speed improvement coe cient in Eq. (7) 1.0
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the minimally connected network remains, the network becomes unchanged again until the end of the exper-
iment. The ﬁnal cumulative change of total welfare ( 1.497 · 10
9 uunits) is much lower than the peak value at
the 65th iteration (2.029 · 10
5 units).
Experiment A3 also starts degeneration at the 20th iteration but stops it as long as the welfare peaks at the
65th iteration. Before this point the A3 curve overlaps with the A2 one. After the degeneration process is ter-
minated, the network soon ﬁnds a new stable status after several iterations. During this short period individual
links quickly adjust their service levels, and travelers quickly adjust their route choices as well. The stable wel-
fare level (2.000 · 10
5 units) is slightly lower than the maximal welfare it has achieved at the 65th iteration.
Since then the network is ﬁxed, which we called the optimal network topology in terms of total social welfare
under the speciﬁc degeneration criteria.
The results of Experiments A1–A3 together reveal how the degeneration process could change the eco-
nomic e ciency of a redundant network. The results of Experiment A2 indicate that the degeneration process
can improve the total social welfare by removing ine cient links, but if a network becomes compact enough,
further degeneration will impair the welfare, which we would call ‘‘over-degeneration’’. Experiment A3 sug-
gests a way for economists to avoid over-degeneration and derive a relatively e cient transportation system,
even though the market is completely autonomous and decentralized, by tracking down the decline phase of
the system and terminating the degeneration process at the point when the cumulative change of total social
welfare peaks.
To illustrate the decline process of the complete network simulated in Experiments A1–A3, Fig. 5 displays
the snapshots of the network at di erent stages: the initial network (iteration 0), the network at equilibrium
before degeneration (iteration 20), the ‘‘optimal’’ network topology with regard to the total social welfare
under speciﬁed degeneration criteria (iteration 65), and the minimally connected network at the end of the
degeneration process (iteration 850). Di erent speed levels of links are displayed as di erent boldness and
grayness.
While economists want to maximize the total social welfare of a network, policy makers, planners, and
engineers may have di erent objectives, for instance, to maximize consumers’ surplus or accessibility (given
the network infrastructure is completely privatized in our case). Fig. 6 illustrates the ﬂuctuations of accessi-
bility for Experiments A1–A3. The accessibility of the network remains at 15,003 units in Experiment A1 after
the ﬁrst 20 iterations. As the degeneration process is executed throughout Experiment A2, the accessibility
consistently drops to 4098 units at the end of the experiment. No increase is observed as in the ﬂuctuation
of total social welfare. Experiment A3 stops the degeneration process at the 65th iteration when the maximal
welfare is reached, and the network is quickly stabilized on a slightly lower level of accessibility. The decrease
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Fig. 4. The cumulative change of welfare (Experiments A1–A3).
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the degeneration process a ects the accessibility and total social welfare of a network di erently: it always
impairs the overall accessibility because the removal of links and nodes from the network unavoidably reduces
travelers’ ﬂexibility in choosing their routes and destinations and accordingly increases their cost spent on tra-
vel, while it may improve the total welfare of the network by removing proﬁtless links at the beginning,
because the savings on the deﬁcit (at least in a myopic term) of these removed links may compensate the loss
of travelers, and thus beneﬁts the system as a whole. Similar to the measure of accessibility, consumers’ surplus
is also consistently dropping as the degeneration process is executed in Experiments A2 and A3, suggesting
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Fig. 5. Snapshots of the declining network. (1) The initial network (iteration 0) (2) The network topology at equilibrium before
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Fig. 6. The change of accessibility (Experiments A1–A3).
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The results of Experiments A2, B, and C, shown in Fig. 7, exhibit similar ﬂuctuations of welfare over time
(especially at the beginning of the degeneration process), suggesting that the evolution of network e ciency is
not sensitive to di erent evaluation criteria that determine the weakest link(s) during the degeneration process
of a network.
7. Conclusions
The contribution of the paper to the literature is that for the ﬁrst time it carried out a theoretic exploration
into the economic mechanisms behind the decline of a surface transportation network at a microscopic level,
and modeled this process based on the assumption that the decline phase is a spontaneous process driven by
completely decentralized and autonomous decisions of individual travelers and privatized infrastructure seg-
ments (links). The decline of a network is enabled by the degeneration process by which the weakest link(s) is
removed iteratively from the network according to simple evaluation criteria of link performance.
Our simulation model can be also thought of as a monopolistically competitive model, which corroborates
the phenomenon of spatial competition over an urban space (Christaller, 1933). Viewing a transportation net-
work as a single market with the total travel demand ﬁxed, as proﬁtless links are shut down, the market
demand of the remaining links increases, such that e cient links will be further reinforced while less e cient
links will be degenerated until abandoned. Likewise, as nodes that connect to failed links are shut down, the
market area of land uses they originally occupy will be taken by neighboring surviving nodes, which then
become more attractive to travelers. Consequently, hierarchical links and places emerge over time. During this
process, the rise and fall of link rents (proﬁtability) triggers the removal of failed links and nodes, and the
change of market density in turn ampliﬁes the di erentiation of link rents. A model of co-evolution of a trans-
portation network and land use could incorporate land use dynamics in response to the evolution of the net-
work, with the potential to better interpret the spatial competition over network and urban space (Levinson
et al., 2006). Moreover, inspired by the spatial patterns of hierarchical places that have been suggested in cen-
tral place theory (Christaller, 1933; King, 1985), we have employed our degeneration model to examine the
spatial patterns of hierarchical transportation networks that emerge over time and space (Xie and Levinson,
2005).
Experimental results show that a turning point exists during the degeneration process regarding total social
welfare: when ine cient links are removed from a redundant network, the total welfare is improved, while if
the degeneration process persists at a point so that proﬁtable links have to be removed, the economic e ciency
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turning point, a relatively e cient network topology can be derived in terms of maximizing the total social
welfare during the decline phase. On the other hand, travelers are always worse o  during the decline phase,
from the perspective of either consumers’ surplus or network accessibility, as the removal of links and nodes
reduces their ﬂexibility and increases their cost of travel. These ﬁndings can be of interest to economists and
policy makers who have to tackle the shrinking infrastructure of a transportation mode while maintaining the
performance of the system.
Aside from directly describing the abandonment of links in an over-invested transportation network,
degeneration can have several other interpretations in transportation studies. It can represent an underdevel-
oped area where all point-to-point paths can be used, and some which are more valuable are made faster while
others are abandoned over time. It can also be used as a model wherein a set of many potential network addi-
tions are considered and degeneration is used to winnow that set. In these cases, the degeneration process is
not limited to the decline phase of the life cycle that it literally resembles. Instead, it is coupled with a growth
process in which a system grows and declines with important components reinforced while weak components
deprecated.
The simpliﬁed demand model adopted in this study assumes su cient capacities on links and thus ignores
the congestion e ect. This simpliﬁcation is plausible for a theoretical exploration into the long-run evolution
of an over-invested network, and largely reduces the complexity of our simulation model. But a more sophis-
ticated travel demand model that considers congestion delay, system equilibrium, and perhaps perceived travel
time on a congested network, such as Deterministic User Equilibrium model and Stochastic User Equilibrium
model (She , 1985), will improve certain aspects of the realism in the model, at the cost of increased
complexity.
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